“知识论与实验哲学研究”学术沙龙第七十五期通知
发布时间: 2017-10-20 浏览次数: 12


研讨题目:“Different Scopes for Different Folks

报 告 人:侯维之教授(台湾中正大学哲学系)

人:曹剑波教授

间:20171018(星期三)10:10-11:40

点:厦门大学人文学院(南光一)214会议室

方:厦门大学知识论与认知科学研究中心

厦门大学哲学系

报告人介绍:侯维之博士,悉尼大学哲学博士、台湾中正大学哲学系教授

内容简介:The various paradoxes arising from holding the narrow scope truth norms of assertion, such that if (it is true that) p, then it is correct (/proper) to assert that p (TCA), and it is correct (/proper) to assert that p only if (it is true that) p (CAT), are the focus of the discussion. In terms of the slight modification of Parfits Miner Rescue case and the platitude that assertions generally lead to action, or in this particular case, assertions naturally lead to action, it is shown in the second section that (TCA) leads to a narrow scope paradox with the structure of Kolodny and MacFarlanes new deontic paradox the construction of which employs Parfits case as well. Also in this section, possible pragmatic manoeuvres and solution given by Kolodny and MacFarlane are shown to be either inapplicable or irrelevant. Relative to the consideration of the different scopes of the negation of the normativity of (CAT), it is shown in the third section that (CAT) relies on a mind-boggling account to escape from a possible narrow scope paradox. By means of the wide scope reading of the negation of the normative operators, three wide scope paradoxes of (TCA) and (CAT) are further given in the fourth and the fifth sections to establish that the acceptance of (TCA) and (CAT) all leads to inconsistency. Also in the fifth section, in terms of an analysis of the narrow scope and the wide scope versions the latter is shown to be preferable, which validates that (TCA) and (CAT) in some cases lead to inconsistency and therefore ought to be given up.